The Eurozone and the legitimacy deficit

As the Economist has pointed out this week, the essence of any solution to the Eurozone crisis is its legitimacy ie its acceptance by European citzens.

The German plan for European Enterprise Zones (see blog post "Enterprise Greece and Enterprise Europe") has attracted some criticism, particularly in Greece, as being "another German solution" thus implying lack of legitimacy.

But, by referring to it as an "East German style plan", it is, by analogy, regarding the distressed Eurozone Member States as though they were fellow Germans needing help.

In an earlier post I referred to the fact that one of the barriers to the effective operation of the Eurozone is the fact that the creditor countries regard the debt of debtor countries as someone else's debt.

So maybe, in the words used to describe this latest German idea, there's a recognition, at least at government level in Germany, of the kind of mutual identity without which the legitimacy of any solution cannot be achieved. And legitimacy at government level is the first necessary (though not sufficient) step towards the more difficult task of securing legitimacy amongst the peoples of creditor nations.